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I. Introduction 
In the United States, energy storage systems have played an important role on the 
electric grid for decades, primarily in the form of pumped hydroelectric systems 
constructed in the 1970s. However, the last ten years have seen a surge in a new storage 
technology: battery storage, largely driven by the falling costs of lithium-ion battery 
technology. Since 2011, U.S. installed battery capacity has almost doubled every two 
years (U.S. EIA, 2018b). Installed battery storage capacity exceeded 1000 megawatts 
(MW) by the end of 2018, and the upward trend is expected to continue – the 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) interconnection queue alone has 
almost 600 MW of planned battery storage capacity. (“MISO Generation Interconnection 
Queue”) (Spector, 2019; U.S. EIA, 2018a). As increasing numbers of battery storage 
systems are deployed, grid operators are starting to grapple with the complexities of a 
technology that does not fit neatly into existing market rules and structures. Although 
most energy markets have participation rules for pumped hydroelectric storage systems, 
battery storage systems operate quite differently and require new participation models. 
Battery energy storage can operate as generation, load, or even transmission, and can 
offer multiple ancillary services of value to the grid. The services an energy storage 
installation is willing and able to offer to the grid varies widely based on system 
configuration and installation location. The term value stacking is commonly used in 
conversations about energy storage and refers to the ability of storage to provide multiple 
valuable services to the grid forming a “stack” of potential value to capitalize on. 
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The multi-purpose nature of storage makes it difficult for projects to participate in 
U.S. energy markets in a profitable way. Current market rules do not allow storage 
projects to capture multiple value streams within the stack, which creates a misalignment 
between private and social incentives and leaves value on the table. Because private 
actors do not internalize the full benefits of their potential actions, they underinvest in 
storage. The lack of appropriate market rules and participation models for storage has 
unquestionably been a barrier to battery storage deployment in the United States in recent 
years. To lessen the barriers to market participation, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) released Order 841 in February of 2018 which requires all grid 
operators to amend existing market rules (formalized in filed tariffs) to ensure storage 
resources can participate fully in energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets 
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2018). The Brattle Group estimates that Order 
841’s full implementation will unlock 7000 MW of new battery storage power capacity 
in the United States (St. John, 2018). Preliminary proposal filings from regional 
transmission organizations and independent system operators (RTOs/ISOs) were 
submitted in December of 2018, and full implementation is expected by December of 
2019. 
In light of changing market rules, the timing is ideal to consider questions of energy 
storage value and how various market changes will enable storage to participate in the 
energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets most effectively to maximize private 
value to project owners and social value to the grid. Section II offers background on 
current and historical trends in deployment, technology and cost. Section III will explore 
concepts of storage value, including value stacking and private and social value. Section 
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IV moves to market rules and policy as they currently stand, including prior FERC orders 
on energy storage and a discussion of storage projects operating outside of existing 
markets. Section V provides an overview of FERC Order 841 and a comparative analysis 
of the proposals filed by each of the six federally regulated RTO/ISOs: MISO, California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO), Pennsylvania New Jersey Maryland 
Interconnection (PJM), Independent System Operator - New England (ISO-NE), New 
York Independent System Operator (NYISO), and Southwest Power Pool (SPP).  
Section VI applies economic theory to look beyond Order 841 and illustrate the 
lingering deadweight loss between private value and social value for energy storage. 
Although Order 841 resolves many market inefficiencies, disagreement remains over the 
optimal strategy to manage state of charge, quantify avoided cost, set minimum run 
times, and support social decarbonization goals. State of charge management is examined 
as a case study to explore lingering deadweight loss that prevents the capture of maximal 
private and social value. Private and social value relationships, complicated by risk 
mitigation and the dynamics surrounding resource control, continue to impact and 
potentially limit energy storage deployment even beyond Order 841. As an industry, 
more discussion is needed about the value stack of private and social value, not just the 
stack of revenue available for individual project owners.  
Section VII will end the paper with a discussion of institutional barriers to optimal 
market design for energy storage, and policy options for deploying and utilizing storage 
resources to support grid decarbonization goals.  
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II. Background 
A. Resource Types 
Energy storage for the electric grid is far from a new concept. Pumped hydroelectric 
(pumped hydro) storage systems first appeared in the United States and Europe in the 
1920s, and are designed to both store electricity at the gigawatt scale and provide 
ancillary services to the transmission system (“Pumped Hydroelectric Storage,” 2019). 
These facilities operate by pumping water between two reservoirs at different elevations, 
as illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. Pumped Hydro Diagram (Nikolaidis, Pavlos & Poullikkas, Andreas, 2017) 
As recently as 2011 pumped hydro storage accounted for 98% of global installed energy 
storage capacity (B. Roberts & Harrison, 2011). In the United States alone, 40 pumped 
hydro facilities are in operation today and provide approximately 20 GW of storage 
capacity to the electric grid (“Pumped Hydroelectric Storage,” 2019). These facilities are 
important grid resources, but they face limitations. They require specific geography to be 
constructed and a large amount of upfront capital to construct. Compared to newer 
storage technologies, they are also relatively inflexible and require longer timelines to 
transition from acting as load to acting as generation. 
  
5 
 
Recognizing the shortcomings of pumped hydro as an energy storage solution, the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) ramped up its energy storage research and 
development (R&D) program in 2009, investing $185 million through the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in the form of matching funds for energy 
storage projects (B. Roberts & Harrison, 2011). This successfully catalyzed a period of 
research and innovation for grid-scale storage lasting from 2009 until approximately 
2014. During this five-year period, 124 projects were installed utilizing an impressively 
diverse set of battery storage technologies (Hart & Sarkissian, 2016). The DOE Global 
Energy Storage Database shows that projects installed during this catalyzation period 
listed 27 different ‘use cases’ in their project validation, referring to applications and 
services pursued to capture value (“DOE Global Energy Storage Database,” n.d.). In 
2012, a 5 MW/1.25 Megawatt-hour (MWh) battery was commissioned for Portland 
General Electric through a smart grid pilot funded by the DOE (John Vernacchia, 2017). 
This project was the first large-scale grid battery installed in the U.S. to use a lithium-ion 
chemistry (John Vernacchia, 2017). By 2015, lithium-ion batteries had emerged as the 
most common battery chemistry for project installation (Hart & Sarkissian, 2016). This is 
attributed to both the DOE funding available through ARRA and the huge cost reductions 
lithium-ion batteries saw during this period due to spillover innovation from related 
industries. Cell phone and electric vehicle manufacturing, for example, both rely 
primarily on batteries with a lithium-ion chemistry, and R&D investments in these 
sectors also helped drive cost reductions for lithium-ion battery production and 
installation (Lambert, 2017).  
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Lithium-ion batteries, based on an increase in private investment and sheer MW 
installed, appear to be a competitive option for many energy storage use cases; notably, 
frequency regulation (Hart & Sarkissian, 2016). But it is unclear if lithium-ion will be the 
best storage technology and chemistry for all energy storage applications.  In a 2016 
report prepared for the Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis researchers quote 
IHS estimates that “the total U.S. energy market opportunity for storage systems that 
would participate in frequency regulation markets to be only 3% of a total potential U.S. 
grid-scale battery market over 100GW in 2030…Major applications in the future include 
transmission and distribution services that reduce the need for other capital investments, 
renewables integration, and peak shaving/demand management” (Hart & Sarkissian, 
2016).  
Several other promising grid-scale storage technologies are under development, 
and can be sorted into three broad categories: kinetic energy technologies, 
electrochemical technologies, and thermal storage (Hart, Bonvillian, & Austin, 2018). 
Thermal storage refers to technologies that can store energy as heat or cold but cannot 
inject electricity back on to the grid. Therefore, thermal storage solutions are usually 
considered separately from other grid-scale storage resources and will not be considered 
in the scope of this work. Table 1 lists the key technology solutions in use and in 
development within the kinetic and electrochemical categories. Intuitively, kinetic energy 
storage focuses on capturing electrical energy in a mechanism from which it can be 
released as kinetic energy (energy of motion). Pumped hydro relies on gravity to move 
water back down to the lower reservoir when stored energy needs to be released. 
Flywheels, similarly in motion, rely on the turning of a wheel. Electrochemical energy 
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storage relies on the conversion of electrical energy to chemical energy within a battery 
for storage.  
Table 1 Grid-scale energy storage technologies by type. Developed from (“ESA,” 2019; Hart et al., 2018) 
Category Key Technologies 
Kinetic Pumped hydroelectric 
Compressed air energy storage (CAES) 
Flywheels 
Electrochemical Lithium-Ion Batteries 
Lead Acid Batteries 
Nickel-based Batteries 
Flow Batteries 
 
These technology types offer different combinations of two key storage parameters: 
power capacity and duration. Power capacity refers the to the system’s maximum 
possible electrical output, expressed in watts. Duration refers to the length of time over 
which a system can maintain its electrical output, generally expressed in hours. The 
diagram in Figure 2, produced by the Interstate Renewable Energy Council, shows the 
loose relationships between power and duration for different technology types.  
 
Figure 2. Performance Characteristics of Energy Storage (Stanfield, Petta, & Baldwin Auck, 2017) 
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When multiplied together, power capacity and duration give a system’s energy capacity, 
expressed in watt-hours.   
B. Terminology and Scope 
 Going forward in this document, pumped hydro will be considered in a separate 
category from other energy storage resources. This is done for two reasons: first, pumped 
hydro’s historical trends and use cases are quite different from the other energy storage 
technologies that have taken off in the last ten years, and require a different frame of 
reference to understand; second, pumped hydro facilities are sizable in comparison to 
most other storage resources (gigawatt project sizes versus kilowatt or megawatt project 
sizes), and the newly installed energy storage resources look negligible when held up 
against these mammoth projects. Pumped hydro storage remains an important resource 
for the U.S. electric grid, but the purpose of this analysis is primarily to examine more 
recent energy storage trends and market rules that affect the likelihood that these new 
resource types will reach gigawatt-scale deployment. For clarity, the following three 
terms will be used throughout the document: 
1) Energy storage and pumped hydro: Inclusive of all technologies in Table 1 
2) Energy storage: Excludes pumped hydro, includes all other Table 1 technologies  
3) Battery storage: Refers only to the technologies listed as “Electrochemical”  
 Only energy storage resources that can both receive and inject electricity onto the 
grid will be considered in scope. Therefore, all forms of thermal storage and natural gas 
storage will not be discussed in this work. This analysis is also focused on projects that 
are in front of the meter, meaning they are distribution or transmission grid connected 
and do not sit at a customer site behind the utility meter. All forms for energy storage in 
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all locations (in front of and behind the utility meter) are important to study and 
understand but limiting the scope to projects of the type and size addressed by FERC 
Order 841 was necessary for this work. Discussion in Section VI and VII will address 
these “excluded” resources in terms of next steps for future research and relevant FERC 
efforts that remain in development. 
C. U.S. Market Trends & Storage Use Cases 
 Since 2015, battery storage deployment has ramped up and costs have declined 
across a variety of technology types. However, lithium-ion battery chemistries continue 
to dominate – by the end of 2017, 80% of installed US battery storage capacity used a 
lithium-ion chemistry (U.S. EIA, 2018a). At the end of 2017, the United States had 708 
MW of installed battery storage power capacity (867 MWh energy capacity) spread 
across the country. 2018 saw an additional 311 MW come online, for a total of 1,019 
MW battery power capacity installed (Spector, 2019; U.S. EIA, 2018a). The two most 
dominant battery storage markets through 2017 are PJM, with 40% of existing battery 
power capacity installed (30% of energy capacity) and CAISO, with 18% of installed 
battery power capacity (44% of energy capacity) (U.S. EIA, 2018a). These markets have 
dominated battery storage installations due to favorable market rules and policy 
incentives (to be explored more fully in Section III) – namely, a robust frequency 
regulation1 market in PJM and a state-wide policy in California requiring utilities to 
procure storage resources. Often, due to technical design constraints, storage systems 
                                                          
1 Frequency regulation is defined in Table 2 and Table 3 and refers to a service that helps the grid 
maintain a consistent frequency of 60 Hz by making minute generation adjustments up or down every 
millisecond 
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excel at providing energy capacity or power capacity. To do both effectively is less 
common, and installations will skew towards energy or power capacity depending on 
what the regional market values (Deloitte, 2015). Figure 2, below, from the EIA Battery 
Storage Market Trend Report, provides a visual illustration of these trends by region, 
including the graph at left showing total large-scale power capacity trends for 
comparison2. 
 
Figure 3. “Figure 1: Large-Scale U.S. Power and Energy Capacity by Region (2017)” (U.S. EIA, 2018a) 
 Different market rules in the CAISO and PJM markets explain the difference in 
the percentage of energy capacity and power capacity in each market in Figure 3. In the 
CAISO market, generation resources must provide at least 4 hours of output to contribute 
reliability reserves in the market. This requires storage resources in the CAISO market to 
have larger energy capacities in order to meet the 4-hour output requirement (U.S. EIA, 
2018a). In contrast, the PJM market is dominated by installations providing frequency 
regulation services which can be compensated in the market for their fast, short response 
and therefore do not require extensive output durations.  
                                                          
2 For this illustration, large-scale is defined as installations greater than 1 MW power capacity. 
  
11 
 
 As of 2016, energy storage power capacity ownership was largely split between 
ownership by independent power producers (IPPs) – more common in the PJM market – 
and ownership by Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) – more common in the CAISO market 
(U.S. EIA, 2018a). More recent data from the DOE’s Global Energy Storage Database 
shows that as of February 2019, energy storage ownership is now fairly evenly divided 
between utilities, customers, and third party actors (“DOE Global Energy Storage 
Database,” n.d.). Within the category of utility-owned storage projects, over 70% are 
owned by IOUs (“DOE Global Energy Storage Database,” n.d.).  
 
Figure 4. Battery Storage Ownership Trends (“DOE Global Energy Storage Database,” n.d.)3 
Across U.S. battery storage installations, project sizes range from 0.1 MW to 36 MW 
power capacity, and from 0.03 MWh to 250 MWh energy capacity (“DOE Global Energy 
Storage Database,” n.d.). The average project size for battery technology projects is 3.8 
MW (7.1 MWh) with a median of 1 MW (1 MWh) (“DOE Global Energy Storage 
Database,” n.d.). Flywheel projects in the database are sized similarly, but the pumped 
hydro and CAES projects trend meaningfully larger (“DOE Global Energy Storage 
Database,” n.d.). Most projects are projected to operate for 10 to 20 years.  
                                                          
3 Using 214 projects listed as operational in the U.S. 
36%
29%
35%
Battery Storage Ownership Model, 2019
Customer-Owned
Third-Party-
Owned
Utility-Owned
  
12 
 
 U.S. energy storage project owners list a variety of key applications and services4 
provided by their storage installation. More than twenty different use cases were listed in 
the database, the most relevant of which are captured in Table 2 below. Many of these 
services will be revisited in Section III and IV as they pertain to market rules, but a brief 
description of each use case is provided below for reference.  
Table 2. Use Cases for battery storage projects greater than 100kW power capacity (“DOE Global Energy Storage 
Database,” n.d.; Stanfield et al., 2017; U.S. EIA, 2018b)  
Use Case Description 
Black Start 
     
Help the grid restart after an outage  
Demand Response Act as load that can be called upon by the 
utility to increase or decrease usage to help 
balance supply and demand 
Electric Bill Management Implies an application that uses the storage 
resource for energy arbitrage: charging when 
prices are low, discharging when prices are 
high 
Renewable Energy Time Shift Pair with a resource (such as solar) and use 
storage to shift hours when the owner is 
selling energy to the grid  
Electric Supply Capacity Participate in the capacity market as a 
generating capacity resource 
Reserve Capacity (Spinning/Non-Spinning) Provide the grid with additional generating 
reserves that can come online quickly 
Frequency Regulation Help the grid maintain a consistent frequency 
of 60 Hz by making minute generation 
adjustments up or down every millisecond 
Microgrid Capability Support a microgrid that can island itself 
from the grid and operate independently 
On-Site Power Provide power to a residential, commercial, 
or industrial facility 
Ramping/Load Following Operate the storage resource flexibly and 
“follow” system load as it increases or 
decreases in real time 
Transmission/Distribution Upgrade Deferral 
     
Act as a transmission or distribution resource 
Peak Demand Management Provide peak demand reduction/load 
modulation to ensure supply and demand are 
matched cost-effectively 
Renewables Capacity Firming Make renewable resources more dispatchable 
by absorbing or releasing micro-variations in 
                                                          
4 Collectively referred to as “use cases” 
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system output to match market commitments 
more closely 
Figure 4 shows the top ten most commonly listed use cases, including their ranking as the 
first to fourth service being provided (indicating primary use case, secondary use case, 
etc.) for each of the energy storage projects listed as operational in the United States.  
Frequency regulation, energy time shift, electric bill management, and reserve capacity 
dominate the list of primary services provided.  
 
Figure 5. Most commonly listed use cases, Feb 2019. Data from  (“DOE Global Energy Storage Database,” n.d.) 
D. Storage Resource Costs 
During the ARRA investment period (from 2009-2014) battery storage technology 
experienced a wave of cost declines and installation rates began to pick up across the 
globe (Hart & Sarkissian, 2016). Between 2012 and 2018 alone, the levelized cost of 
energy (LCOE) for lithium-ion batteries with a four hour duration fell 74% (St. John, 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Renewables Capacity Firming
Demand Response
Electric Supply Capacity
Microgrid Capability
Black Start
Electric Bill Management with Renewables
Electric Supply Reserve Capacity - Spinning
Electric Bill Management
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Frequency Regulation
Count
Top Ten Use Cases
Service/Use
Case 4
Service/Use
Case 3
Service/Use
Case 2
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2019). A 2018 report from GTM Research (now Wood Mackenzie) predicts that energy 
storage system cost reductions will continue at a rate of 8% per year from 2018 to 2022, a 
slight decline from previous years (“Wood Mackenzie,” 2018). 
Lazard’s Levelized Cost of Storage (LCOS) analysis, most recently updated in 
November 2018, analyzed the observed costs and revenue streams available across a 
variety of storage technologies. Several key findings from this analysis are worth noting 
(Lazard, 2018):  
• Cost declines for lithium-ion battery technologies were greater than predicted in the 
most recent year-long period 
• Cobalt and lithium carbonate prices are expected to rise, which will reduce or 
eliminate future declines in lithium-ion battery technology costs 
• Factory utilization is high, which may delay battery availability  
• Storage resources with a duration of 4 hours or less are the most cost-effective storage 
option 
• Project economics continue to improve, but thanks to shrinking costs not rising 
revenues 
Lazard includes a number of LCOS comparisons in the report, including subsidized and 
unsubsidized costs for both power capacity and energy capacity values. Below is the 
unsubsidized LCOS in $/MWh for varied storage technologies at varied locations. 
Overall, the options in front of the meter at the wholesale and utility level show the 
lowest LCOS values (Lazard, 2018). Applications for storage paired with photovoltaic 
(PV) also fair particularly well at both the utility and commercial level.  
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Figure 6. Lazard's LCOS v4.0 - Unsubsidized LCOS $/MWh (Lazard, 2018) 
 
 Overall, project cost continues to be a barrier to energy storage project 
deployment. Financers are unsure if financial projections for projects can be trusted, and 
ongoing uncertainty in capital costs and regulatory changes make storage projects risky to 
pursue. The term “bankability” refers to “how credible a storage project’s overall 
economic viability is considered by traditional lenders” (Robson & Bonomi, 2018).  
Improving the bankability of storage projects will be crucial to continued storage 
deployment, in the United States and globally. Academics and financial experts alike are 
researching strategies to improve bankability in addition to reductions in capital costs – 
some necessary steps include improving warranties, setting international codes and 
standards, and improving revenue stream modeling tools (Robson & Bonomi, 2018).  
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III. Storage Policy & Market Rules 
A. State and Federal Policy 
 From a policy perspective, there are a number of relevant pieces of state and 
federal legislation that were designed to incentivize energy storage deployment. At the 
federal level, the Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) allows project developers 
to request a tax rebate of 30% on any investment in eligible renewable energy technology 
(US DOE, 2017). Although storage resources are not eligible for this tax rebate on their 
own, they are eligible when paired with an eligible solar or wind resources (US DOE, 
2017). Analysts from ICF saw the impact of the ITC when comparing standalone battery 
projects with solar plus storage projects. Often, the standalone projects were simply not 
cost effective, but the combination of solar with storage could improve the project return 
on investment by 10-20% (Gerhardt & Bartels, 2018). Industry stakeholders, led by the 
Energy Storage Association (ESA), are pushing hard for a stand-alone energy storage 
ITC, but their efforts have not received strong support from other renewable energy 
associations thus far.  
 Most policymaking for energy storage at the federal level occurs through the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC is an independent federal agency 
situated within the Department of Energy tasked with regulating the transmission and 
wholesale sale of electricity, natural gas, and oil in interstate commerce (“What FERC 
Does,” 2018). FERC regulates the regional transmission organizations and independent 
system operators pictured in the map below5.  
                                                          
5 The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and the two pictured Canadian ISOs (Alberta Electric 
System Operator and Electric System Operator) are not subject to FERC regulation. 
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Figure 7. Map of FERC's RTO/ISO participants (“RTO/ISO,” 2018) 
Although it looks like most of the Western United States does not participate in an 
organized RTO or ISO, since 2014 CAISO has operated the Western Energy Imbalance 
Market (EIM), a “real-time bulk power trading market” (“About: Western EIM,” 2019). 
The EIM includes utilities like PacifiCorp, Idaho Power, NV Energy, and Arizona Public 
Service. Currently, the EIM offers real-time energy trading and is advertised as an 
opportunity for the western United States to more effectively utilize renewable resources, 
and to economically optimize the grid over a wider footprint in order to save participants 
money (“About: Western EIM,” 2019). CAISO has plans to expand market participation 
opportunities for EIM members to include day-ahead energy, capacity, and ancillary 
services trading to increase economic optimization across the EIM footprint (California 
ISO, 2018). 
 In order to create new federal energy rules, FERC will first issue a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) to solicit stakeholder comments on a proposed rule or 
policy change. After incorporating stakeholder comments where appropriate, FERC will 
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issue an order describing the rule change and a timeline for compliance. Compliance 
generally requires RTO/ISOs to file a response explaining their compliance strategy, and 
to update filed tariffs and market operation processes to reflect the new rule. Over the last 
fifteen years, a number of FERC orders have had direct or indirect implications for 
energy storage. An overview of the relevant FERC orders for energy storage will be 
provided in section B below. 
 At the state level, a handful of states have energy storage mandates and initiatives 
in place, and more than a dozen others have active proceedings relating to energy storage. 
Table 4 lists current energy storage mandates and incentives in the United States. Four 
states have energy storage mandates in place: California, Oregon, Massachusetts, and 
New York (Telaretti & Dusonchet, 2017). Notably, California had a storage procurement 
mandate in place five years earlier than any other state (The Brattle Group, 2018). The 
energy market in Texas, ERCOT, is not subject to FERC regulation. Therefore, Texas 
state legislation serves as a stand-in for the federal rule making process. Texas Senate 
Bill 943, passed in 2011, contained language and requirements similar to FERC Order 
841 and started the process within Texas of increasing market participation opportunities 
for energy storage. 
Table 3. Current State-Level Energy Storage Mandates (Sakti, Botterud, & O’Sullivan, 2018; Telaretti & Dusonchet, 
2017; The Brattle Group, 2018)  
State Year Enacted Description 
California 2010 AB 2514 mandates 1325 MW installed by 2024 
Texas 2011 SB 943 says energy storage can participate in the 
wholesale market (ERCOT).  
Oregon 2015 House Bill 2193 mandates 5 MWh installed by 2020 
Massachusetts 2016 HB/SB 4568 mandates 200 MWh by 2020 
Arizona 2017 PUC must investigate storage target; $4 million 
residential energy storage program 
Maryland 2019 Investment Tax Credit for energy storage 
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New York 2017 Mandate of 1.5 GW by 2025 
 
Beyond these states, close to a dozen others have active legislative proceedings related to 
energy storage. These states include Minnesota, Vermont, New Hampshire, Colorado, 
New Mexico, and Washington D.C., to name a few (Stanfield et al., 2017; The Brattle 
Group, 2018). Many states are considering storage as part of a broader Grid 
Modernization bill or docket, not as a stand-alone procurement mandate. Other state 
storage strategies – some of which are reflected in the table above – include allowing 
storage to count towards the state RPS targets, offering financial or tax incentives for 
storage installations, or requiring utilities to include storage in their integrated resource 
plan (U.S. EIA, 2018a).  
B. FERC and Energy Storage 
 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has addressed energy storage both 
directly and indirectly on a number of occasions. The most notable of these orders are 
Order 890, 719, 745, 755, and 784, which all address energy storage indirectly. Most 
recently, Order 841 built off of these initial orders to directly address market participation 
rules for energy storage. Figure 8 shows the timeline of release for the six most storage-
relevant FERC Orders.  
 
Figure 8. Timeline of storage-relevant FERC orders 
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 FERC Order 890, released in 2007, was primarily written to address “undue 
discrimination and preference in transmission service,” but also included the first 
requirement that non-generating resources be considered on equal footing with traditional 
generating resources for ancillary services and reliability (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, n.d.). Improved opportunities for demand response was the example used 
frequently within the order. In 2007, and still today, many storage resources participate as 
demand response in energy markets. Order 719 followed soon after in 2008, and further 
improved wholesale market participation opportunities for demand response resources by 
requiring all RTO/ISOs to recalculate market prices for energy and ancillary services 
every five minutes (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2008). This rule change 
allowed fast-responding resources – such as demand response and energy storage – to be 
compensated more appropriately for services provided to the grid (Bhatnagar, Currier, 
Hernandez, Ma, & Kirby, 2013; Sakti et al., 2018) 
 2011 saw the release of two related FERC Orders: 745 and 755. First, Order 745 
specifically allowed demand response to participate in wholesale markets when cost 
competitive with other resources. Order 745 also required that participating demand 
response be compensated for reduced consumption at the appropriate locational marginal 
price (LMP) – essentially, at the rate that grid operators would have had to pay a 
generator to meet demand at that time (Walton, 2016). Order 755 followed shortly after 
and improved compensation for ancillary services such as frequency regulation. 755 
separated payment for ancillary services into two streams: one for capacity, and one for 
performance (Kumaraswamy & Cotrone, 2013). This separation greatly improved 
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compensation streams for fast responding resources such as energy storage and led to a 
storage market explosion in PJM – the first market to implement these changes. 
 FERC Order 784, released in 2013, expanded the scope of Order 755 by applying 
the requirements in 755 to all public utilities, not just RTO/ISO participants 
(Kumaraswamy & Cotrone, 2013). In addition, Order 784 revised accounting and 
reporting requirements for energy storage to place additional emphasis on speed and 
accuracy of resource response (Todd Olinsky-Paul, 2015). Overall, the intention of Order 
784 was to “promote transparency, address discrimination, and promote competition in 
ancillary services markets” (Bhatnagar et al., 2013). As seen in this listing, until FERC 
Order 841 was released in early 2018, many FERC activities addressed energy storage 
tangentially, but very little focused attention was given to energy storage participation. 
The release of 841 is likely tied to shifting resource economics and the increasing 
deployment of storage resources over the last decade. Section V provides a deep-dive into 
the requirements in FERC Order 841 and the proposals filed for compliance by regulated 
RTO/ISOs in the United States. 
C. Current Market Participation 
 Energy storage resources provide a variety of services to the grid, as explored in 
the use cases in Table 2. The most notable of these services can be sorted into three 
categories: energy, capacity, and ancillary services. Existing and developing market rules 
tend to address storage market participation within these three categories. Table 3, below, 
defines each category and the key services/use cases included in each category.  
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Table 4. Energy storage services. Adapted from (Forrester, Zaman, Mathieu, & Johnson, 2017) 
Service Description 
Ancillary Services Services that support the reliable operation of the bulk transmission 
system. These services are often split into two categories: 
1) Balancing: services that help the grid remain stable through 
small imbalances of supply and demand. Examples include 
frequency regulation and load following. 
2) Contingency: services that are available to respond in the event 
of an unexpected grid event or failure. Examples include both 
spinning and non-spinning reserves. 
   
Energy Services Storage resources can participate in energy arbitrage to operate 
profitably in existing energy markets: resources charge when energy 
prices are low and discharge when energy prices are high. This 
encapsulates a variety of the services listed in Table 2 including 
electric bill management, electric/renewable energy time shift 
   
Capacity Services In existing capacity markets (not available in all markets), storage 
resources can participate in forward capacity markets much like a 
standard generator. 
   
Current market rules provide some, but not all of these market participation opportunities 
for energy storage resources. The figure below –prepared by Sakti et al – shows a 
comparison of market participation opportunities in all FERC regulated RTO/ISOs as of 
May 2018. The table serves as an ideal reference for market opportunities and barriers for 
energy storage prior to FERC Order 841.  
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Figure 9. Storage Market Participation Opportunities & Barriers,  May 2018 (Sakti et al., 2018) 
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 As mentioned in Section II, CAISO and PJM have seen the most robust battery 
storage market participation to date. Through an ongoing stakeholder process, CAISO 
developed an energy storage participation model for non-generator resources (NGR) that 
was first introduced in 2010. Thoughtfully developed market rules in combination with a 
state policy mandate for storage procurement accelerated the CAISO storage market 
several years ahead of other markets (Sakti et al., 2018). As Section IV will show, 
CAISO has largely complied with the requirements of FERC Order 841 for several years.  
 PJM has also been an interesting market for energy storage in the last five years. 
In 2011, PJM modified its compensation practices for frequency regulation services to 
comply with FERC Order 755, creating two separate compensation streams – one for 
opportunity cost, and one for performance – in order to better compensate fast-
responding resources (Forrester et al., 2017). This change in market rules led to an 
explosion of battery installations in the PJM footprint. However, further market rule 
changes in 2015 and again in 2017 led many developers to physically remove their 
storage resources from the PJM footprint. They claimed the market rule changes 
triggered operational parameter changes that the newly installed resources were not 
designed to accommodate (Forrester et al., 2017). Energy storage market participation 
opportunities across other markets have been sporadic, which triggered FERC’s release 
of Order 841 to create more consistency across markets and more participation 
opportunities across the board. 
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D. External Projects 
 The focus of this work is on changing market rules triggered by FERC Order 841. 
However, many existing (and future) battery storage projects will be completely 
indifferent to these regulatory changes. Many currently installed projects do not operate 
within an area that FERC has jurisdiction over. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
(ERCOT) is not under FERC jurisdiction and is instead governed by the state of Texas. In 
addition to Texas, thirteen other U.S. states do not participate in an organized wholesale 
market, and eight additional states only have partial participation (Stanfield et al., 2017). 
Those regions will not see any change in market participation opportunities due to FERC 
Order 841. However, as CAISO’s EIM continues to expand, much of the western United 
States may benefit from Order 841’s objectives. 
 Energy storage projects installed by distribution utilities may also find themselves 
isolated from these changing market participation opportunities. Small distribution 
utilities are often removed from the price signals coming from an organized market even 
if they are technically a participant – those signals are felt and seen primarily by their 
generation and transmission (G&T) utility or joint action agency (JAA). For example, a 
recent battery storage project completed by Minnesota cooperative utility Connexus 
Energy operates primarily as a demand response asset to avoid high demand charges 
from their G&T, Great River Energy. Connexus installed a co-located 10 MW solar plus 
15 MW (30 MWh) storage system in late 2018 (Burandt, 2018). In order to maximize the 
lifetime of the storage system and ensure the project economics are favorable, 
Connexus’s storage can only be “called” 75 times a year and will only operate as a 
demand response resource when requested by Great River Energy. This allows Connexus 
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to minimize the demand charges they see from Great River Energy and save enough 
money to cover the cost of the installed system.  
 United Power,  a large cooperative utility in the greater Denver area, installed a 
similar battery storage system early this year (Best, 2019). Much like Connexus, United 
Power is isolated from RTO/ISO market signals and instead uses their storage system to 
minimize charges from their G&T, Tri-State. Both Great River Energy and Tri-State have 
expressed frustration with these projects, and Tri-State issued a policy in response to 
United Power’s project to cap the amount of storage their distribution utility members are 
allowed to install (Best, 2019).  
 All this to say: FERC Order 841 does not affect every stakeholder in the U.S. 
energy storage market. Some projects will remain isolated from its impacts, while others 
will see their project economics change drastically. FERC’s authority is limited to 
regulating transmission and wholesale energy transactions in interstate commerce. State-
level regulators and policymakers will continue to play a critical role in increasing market 
opportunities for energy storage, by building off Order 841 and providing additional 
opportunities that are beyond the scope of FERC’s interests and authority.  
IV. Value Concepts and Market Theory 
 
 As market rules, policy, and project economics for battery storage shift, it is 
imperative to turn next to a discussion of value. This multifaceted concept comes up 
frequently in the national conversation about battery energy storage. This section will 
briefly introduce the market inefficiencies and “missed value” opportunities in today’s 
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storage industry, introduce the concept of value stacking for private value, and explore 
the social value of storage for decarbonization. 
A. Value and Market Efficiency 
 It is particularly challenging to create efficient market structures in the U.S. 
energy landscape because the energy industry is heavily regulated at both the state and 
federal level. This regulation is primarily intended to promote market efficiency and 
mitigate the power held by monopoly utilities in noncompetitive market environments, 
but the layers of regulation often lead to inefficiencies and disagreements over who has 
the authority to regulate whom. In addition, not all regulation is intended to promote 
efficiency – market regulators may have other pressing goals like low-income 
protections, reliability, or rural electrification.  
 Some states have restructured the energy industry, meaning there are additional 
opportunities for competition at the distribution level and utilities do not own generation 
(are not vertically integrated). Other states remain traditionally regulated, with vertically 
integrated utilities given monopoly service territories. Most RTO/ISO energy markets 
include states with both regulated and deregulated energy systems, adding complexity to 
the development of market rules that will promote efficiency for all participating actors 
and maximize net value at all levels.  
 Traditional economic theory says that that markets operate efficiently when the 
following conditions are met (Keohane & Olmstead, 2016):  
1) The market is competitive – all actors are aiming to maximize value 
2) All market actors have full and complete information  
3) All relevant costs and benefits are included in market transactions 
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For energy storage participation in RTO/ISO markets prior to Order 841, these conditions 
are not consistently met across all RTO/ISOs, creating opportunities to optimize market 
efficiency and increase value for actors at all scales. In particular, condition #3 is far from 
met for energy storage under current market conditions because numerous monetizable 
revenue streams for services are not available at the private level even though those 
services may provide huge social benefit. For example, a recent storage cost-benefit 
analysis completed by the state of Massachusetts set out to determine the public benefits 
of deploying 600 MW of storage power capacity in the state (State of Charge: 
Massachusetts Energy Storage Initiative, 2016). The assessment showed that a much 
higher amount of storage would be optimal for the Massachusetts grid – up to 1766 MW 
– producing $2.3 billion in benefits to ratepayers in the form of reduced electricity prices, 
reduced peak demand, deferred grid updates, and reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, among others (State of Charge: Massachusetts Energy Storage Initiative, 
2016). The authors specifically note that although the public benefits of energy storage 
deployment far outweigh the costs, existing private revenue mechanisms are inadequate 
for the benefits to outweigh the costs for a private developer (State of Charge: 
Massachusetts Energy Storage Initiative, 2016). For many markets, this disconnect 
between monetizable private value and deliverable social value leads storage deployment 
levels to stay far below the ideal level. In Massachusetts, only 2 MW of storage power 
capacity is operational even though 1766 MW is considered optimal – that equates to 
0.1% of the optimal amount of storage power capacity on the Massachusetts grid! 
 The results of the Massachusetts study, where public benefits are huge but private 
benefits are virtually non-existent, indicate a lack of policy and market rules to align 
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private and societal interests.  This is a key example of the existence of a positive 
externality in the storage market due to the exclusion of relevant benefits from the 
market. Figure 10, below, shows a supply and demand curve experiencing a positive 
externality. Marginal private benefits (MBprivate) are far below the optimal marginal social 
benefit (MBsocial) level, resulting in a dead weight loss (DWL) of value for all market 
actors – both individuals and society at large. 
 
Figure 10. Private and Social Value Relationships 
When large public benefits are available, but the market is not mature enough to 
appropriately compensate private actors for the value being provided, a disconnect exists 
between private and social value. The disconnect or tension between private and social 
value for energy storage differs by location of interconnection: behind the customer 
meter, distribution connected, and transmission connected. If the project is located behind 
the customer meter, private value is assessed for an individual customer-owner, likely 
engaged in simple revenue opportunities like energy arbitrage, electric bill management, 
or renewable energy time shift for a paired home solar system.  If the project is located on 
the distribution or transmission grid, private value may be accrued by an IPP and the 
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project is more likely to be pursuing wholesale market value opportunities in the energy, 
capacity, or ancillary services markets. Depending on the market these resources are 
located in, the most profitable private value opportunities may not align at all with the 
highest value opportunities for the grid. For example, in a market with highly restricted 
ancillary services participation opportunities for storage, a distribution-level storage 
resource may default to providing only demand response to the grid, even though the 
resource is capable of delivering much more value through services like frequency 
regulation or spinning reserves. 
 In other words, private and social value may not be at odds, but incentives are 
simply not appropriately aligned. Individual resources owners then chase their own self-
interest (profitability, through available revenue streams), but an inefficient market 
design means they may select services that do not have the highest social value or may 
chose not to construct the project at all. For energy storage, both private and social value 
streams can be increased through market optimization to shrink or eliminate the dead 
weight loss and match social benefits to private benefits.  
 FERC Order 841 is a first attempt to eliminate some dead weight loss from the 
market by monetizing value streams that private resource owners are already capable of 
providing, therefore creating additional social value that was not available before.  
Section VI will examine the areas in which Order 841 has successfully aligned and 
maximized private and social benefits, as well as identify where and why inefficiencies 
still exist. 
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B. Value Stacking and Private Value 
 Value stacking as a concept is not exclusive to energy storage, but it is discussed 
frequently within the storage industry in the context of private value available to 
individual actors. The basic principle behind project-level value stacking comes down to 
this: for a resource like storage, the system owner or operator may need or want to 
capture more than one value or revenue stream in order to make the investment profitable 
long-term. This requires providing multiple grid services to create a stack of value for the 
resource owner. Market rules allow specific grid services that storage provides to be 
monetized, creating multiple revenue streams. If captured, these revenue streams make 
projects more likely to be built. Market rules that do not allow all value streams to be 
monetized can lead to socially sub-optimal usage or deployment of storage resources. 
The concept of value stacking has been considered the “holy grail” for energy storage for 
the last several years but has proved difficult to actually implement. Often storage 
systems are providing multiple high-value services, but market structures are not 
sophisticated enough to compensate storage appropriately for all those services. As 
discussed above, these outdated market compensation structures motivated FERC to 
release Order 841 to reduce the deadweight loss in the market and increase the stack of 
values available for private capture.  
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Figure 11. Left: Energy Storage Value Stack – Visual Illustration from IREC (Stanfield et al., 2017); Right: Private 
value stack positionality within storage market 
 In 2015, the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) completed a foundational report on 
energy storage value stacking that continues to be a key reference in the industry on this 
topic. In the report, RMI identified thirteen different services that battery storage can 
provide to the grid at different service levels: customer services, utility services, and 
RTO/ISO services (Fitzgerald, Mandel, Morris, & Touati, 2015). They analyzed six 
leading studies of the value of each service, in normalized $/kW, and found that the 
results varied dramatically between studies – by as much as 600% (Fitzgerald et al., 
2015). RMI attributes this massive variation to the huge number of variables involved in 
estimating energy storage value, and the varied and changing market rules for storage. In 
fact, RMI’s modeling efforts artificially removed all existing regulatory barriers in order 
to produce meaningful results, a sign of just how far existing market rules are from 
optimal for energy storage resources.  
 The key challenges identified in the report are: regulatory variation among states 
and regions, sensitivity of results to small technical system specification parameters, and 
primary dispatch constraints (Fitzgerald et al., 2015). Primary dispatch, perhaps the most 
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interesting of the three, is worth further discussion as a barrier because it is a constraint to 
the value a storage system can capture. If the resource is assigned a primary dispatch 
service – for example, frequency regulation – it may not be available to optimally 
dispatch other services like real-time energy because it is required to always be available 
to provide the primary dispatch service6.   
 Within any work considering the potential of a value stack, there is an 
acknowledgement of the tension between maximizing value by stacking services and 
ensuring longevity of the battery resource over a time window long enough to support the 
project economics. Most electrochemical batteries can only be discharged a finite number 
of times before they need to be replaced, which can lead operators to focus on just one or 
two high value services to ensure the battery is not “worn out” in just a few years. 
Therefore, the strategy to maximize value over a given day may look very different than 
the strategy to maximize value over a project’s lifetime. Concerns over longevity also 
drive the desire from private actors to manage and control the resource state of charge, 
thereby managing the charge cycles occurring per day. By controlling state of charge, 
private actors can mitigate the risk of “wearing out” the battery before scheduled 
retirement. Issues of resource control and risk management continue to create tensions 
between private and social actors for storage resources: for grid operators, fully private 
management of state of charge can limit the efficiency of the market and leave value on 
                                                          
6 A key takeaway from the Rocky Mountain Institute report was that storage resources are able to 
maximize their value stack when situated behind a customer meter (Fitzgerald, Mandel, Morris, & Touati, 
2015). This position allows the storage resource to (theoretically) provide all thirteen services and 
therefore offers the potential to capture the maximum amount of value. However, in reality behind the 
meter (BTM) resources cannot provide services to the utility or the RTO/ISO in any part of the U.S. right 
now with the exception of California. 
  
34 
 
the table, but most private actors gravitate towards a self-management approach as a 
necessary form of project risk mitigation. 
 Groups like the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) are developing tools to 
quantify available revenue streams and help developers determine if it is economical to 
build a project in a given market (“Storage Value Estimation Tool,” 2016). Their publicly 
available Storage Valuation Estimation Tool (StorageVET) is useful for determining the 
shape and profitability of a potential value stack, but at present it only incorporates 
regulatory assumptions for the CAISO market. IREC’s Charging Ahead report indicates 
that at present, there is no “silver bullet” modeling methodology for energy storage 
valuation (Stanfield et al., 2017). Available tools and methods vary widely based on the 
intended use of the results, and these tools will continue to evolve as the storage industry 
matures.  
C. Social Value and Decarbonization 
 Storage resources are often touted as the ultimate tool for grid decarbonization 
and are assumed to offer a high social value to the grid for reducing carbon emissions 
when paired with renewable resources. In fact, decarbonization is often the stated or 
implicit goal of storage procurement mandates or incentives to accelerate storage 
deployment. In many ways this is an accurate assumption, but storage does not inherently 
support social decarbonization goals without appropriate market rules in place for private 
actors. As market rules shift at a time when the urgency of climate change is coming to 
the fore (both nationally and globally), it is important to focus on this particular form of 
social value to determine if market rules are enabling private actors to contribute to social 
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decarbonization goals, or exacerbating misalignments between private and social value 
streams.  
 First, the value storage offers for grid decarbonization can vary widely based on 
the duration of the storage resource in consideration. Research for the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC) from 2014 found that using storage to avoid renewable 
curtailment on the CAISO system provides significant system value, but to avoid 
curtailment longer duration storage was much more effective (Energy+Environmental 
Economics, 2014). In this 2014 analysis, long duration is defined as at least four hours of 
run time, and study authors hypothesize that increasing long duration storage on the 
CAISO system would also minimize GHG emissions by reducing the number of times 
fossil fuel “peaker” plants are needed in a given year (Energy+Environmental 
Economics, 2014). Although this result is not verified analytically in the report, the 2014 
CAISO system often required 4-5 hours of fossil fuel run time to meet the evening peak 
which a shorter duration (less than 4 hours runtime) storage resource could not easily 
replace.  
 More recent collaborative research from MIT and the Argonne National 
Laboratory came to similar conclusions. Modeling efforts by De Sisternes and Jenkins 
showed that shorter duration storage resources (2 hours or less) only made sense when 
very stringent GHG emissions reductions were required by the model (de Sisternes, 
Jenkins, & Botterud, 2016). Barring huge reductions in cost, these shorter duration 
systems did not warrant massive deployment. Longer duration storage (defined here as at 
least 10 hours of runtime), however, more consistently delivered system value even in 
lower GHG emissions reduction scenarios (de Sisternes et al., 2016). Notably, neither 
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short or long duration were essential for a decarbonized grid if nuclear energy was 
included as an option in the grid resource mix (de Sisternes et al., 2016).  
 Second, depending on the services provided and existing grid mix, adding energy 
storage can actually cause emissions to increase. Research from Carnegie Mellon 
University in 2015 drew meaningful attention when it found that adding energy storage to 
the current U.S. electric grid increased emissions in the short term (Hittinger & Azevedo, 
2015). Importantly, the energy storage systems that Hittinger and Azevedo modeled were 
only assumed to provide one service: energy arbitrage. They found that most often, it was 
cheapest for the storage systems to charge from baseload resources like coal and natural 
gas plants, thereby causing baseload fossil fuel plants to run more often to accommodate 
their added demand (Hittinger & Azevedo, 2015). This accounted for the meaningful net 
increase in emissions. Their work is an important counternarrative to the notion that 
storage is inherently a clean or renewable energy option offering high value for grid 
decarbonization efforts. In reality, storage resources may even counter efforts to 
decarbonize the grid if they are not operated appropriately.  
 As the cost of renewable resources continues to fall faster than the cost of storage, 
some groups are starting to suggest that overbuilding wind and solar capacity and 
dispatching or curtailing as necessary may actually be a more cost-effective way to meet 
decarbonization goals than deploying meaningful storage capacity (Putnam & Perez, 
2018). However, storage continues to play a role in the most aggressive decarbonization 
scenarios. Recent modeling of the Minnesota electric grid by Vibrant Clean Energy 
showed that by 2035, energy storage was selected for all decarbonization scenarios 
modeled (Vibrant Clean Energy, 2018). Although suggested deployment varied from as 
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low as 2 GW (35 GWh) to as high as 9.5 GW (166 GWh), all scenarios showed that more 
storage on the system lowered both emissions and costs (Vibrant Clean Energy, 2018).  
 In many ways, storage and renewables go hand in hand – “the new power 
couple,” ICF researchers joke (Gerhardt & Bartels, 2018). Although it is undeniably 
accurate that a storage resource can increase the value of an intermittent resource when 
paired with it directly, it is important to caveat any statements about the overall grid value 
of storage as a complement to renewables and thereby to decarbonization efforts. Storage 
can offer social value for grid decarbonization, but it must be deployed at the right 
locations, with adequate duration, and with appropriate market and policy mechanisms in 
place to realize its full decarbonization value. Section VI and VII will examine how 
effectively FERC Order 841 has improved the alignment between private and social 
value streams to encourage decarbonization, and will discuss additional policy and 
research that may be needed to further eliminate dead weight loss in the storage market 
and optimize the social value available from decarbonization. 
V. Comparative Analysis 
A. FERC Order 841 
 FERC Order 841 was released in February of 2018, with initial compliance filings 
due by December of 2018. The primary objective of Order 841 was to “require each RTO 
and ISO to revise its tariff to establish a participation model consisting of market rules 
that, recognizing the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources, 
facilitates their participation in the RTO/ISO markets” (Federal Energy Regulatory 
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Commission, 2018). The order clarifies that the revised participation models for storage 
must meet four key requirements:  
1) Ensure storage resources can provide all energy, capacity, and ancillary services 
they are technically cable of providing. 
2) Ensure storage resources can be dispatched and can set the market price as both a 
buyer and a seller. 
3) Account for the “physical and operational” characteristics of storage resources. 
4) Set the minimum size requirement for market participation at 100 kW. 
Stated simply, the goal of Order 841 is to remove barriers to participation for storage, 
enhance market competition, and support the resiliency of the grid (Energy Storage 
Association, 2018). FERC considered including requirements for distributed energy 
resource (DER) aggregation in the order (which is highly applicable for behind the meter 
storage resources) but determined the scope was too large and removed DER aggregation 
to be addressed in a future order (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2018).  
 The official order includes hundreds of pages of detail and all together 76 
different directives that RTO/ISO markets must address (St. John, 2018). FERC was 
careful to define electric storage as “a resource capable of receiving electric energy from 
the grid and storing it for later injection of electric energy back to the grid,” thereby 
excluding thermal resources from falling under the jurisdiction of Order 841 (Energy 
Storage Association, 2018). In general FERC rulemaking proceeds cautiously to preserve 
the delicate balance of state and federal power when issuing a ruling. The scope of their 
jurisdiction is very carefully limited to transmission and wholesale sales of energy in 
interstate commerce, and any deviation from that scope will trigger litigation. Although 
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FERC offered fairly detailed guidelines on what must be addressed by each RTO/ISO, 
the “how” of implementation is mostly left up to the RTO/ISO. Among other 
requirements, Order 841 requires that RTO/ISO markets allow storage resources to de-
rate capacity to meet minimum run time requirements, establish appropriate bidding 
parameters for storage, and allow storage resources to self-manage state of charge (The 
Brattle Group, 2018). RTO/ISO markets must also address how they will manage 
complexities such as: 
• Avoiding conflicting dispatch instructions: how will the market ensure a storage 
resource is not asked to both charge and discharge in the same interval? 
• Provide storage make-whole payments: how will the market re-pay storage 
resources for transmission access charges accrued when the grid operator requires 
the resource to charge? 
• Participation in ancillary services without offering energy services: can a 
resource provide services such as frequency regulation without also submitting an 
energy schedule? 
• Minimum run time: what will the market require as the minimum consecutive run 
time to offer forward capacity? Shorter runtime requirements are often easier for 
resources to meet, but longer runtimes are less complicated for the ISO/RTO to 
manage. 
Although the filings submitted by each RTO and ISO market in December of 2018 
contain many similarities, the strategy and methods developed by each market vary. 
Below, each filing’s proposed participation model will be discussed, followed by a 
comparison matrix showing market compliance on each of the order’s key required 
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components. Some of the preliminary concerns expressed by stakeholder groups – most 
notably the Energy Storage Association – will be discussed here and in Section VI. In 
every response filing submitted, ESA notes that no market compliance plan has discussed 
how storage that is co-located with a generation resource (such as solar) will be treated, 
and if participation opportunities will be different for these resources (Kaplan, 2019e). 
Given that only co-located storage resources are eligible to take the federal ITC, it is 
critical to ensure that these resources are not limited in any way by the participation 
models proposed.  
1. California Independent System Operator 
 CAISO’s compliance filing for Order 841 was the sparsest of the filings. As 
alluded to in previous sections, CAISO was nearly in compliance with the requirements 
of Order 841 many years in advance. Driven by the state-wide storage procurement 
mandate passed in 2010, the CAISO embarked on a multi-year stakeholder process to 
develop three storage participation models. In fact, many of Order 841’s 
recommendations refer to CAISO’s storage participation model as the best-in-class 
standard that other markets should replicate. As a result, the CAISO filing is very short 
and is primarily spent describing all the ways in which their tariff already meets FERC’s 
new requirements (Weaver, Collanton, & Mannheim, 2018). The only major change 
CAISO made to comply with the filing was to lower their minimum size threshold from 
500 kW to 100 kW (Weaver et al., 2018).  
CAISO’s participation model relies on three distinct models for energy storage: 
1) Non-generator resources (NGR): Resources that operate as either generation or load 
that can be dispatched to any operating level within their entire capacity range but are 
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also constrained by a MWh limit to (1) generate energy (2) curtail consumption for 
demand response or (3) consume energy (Weaver et al., 2018). The NGR model is the 
most commonly used option for energy storage resources and offers the most 
flexibility and participation opportunities of the three models. NGR resources must 
complete both a participating generator agreement and a participating load agreement 
(Weaver et al., 2018). 
2) Pumped hydro: The CAISO market has a high number of pumped hydro units when 
compared to other markets. To accommodate these units CAISO has developed a 
separate participation model specifically for pumped hydro facilities. They can 
participate in two modes, Generating Unit or Participating Load, and can submit bids 
in both modes (Weaver et al., 2018). 
3) Demand response: Storage systems in the CAISO market are welcome to participate 
solely as demand response. This option is particularly popular for behind the meter 
resources (Weaver et al., 2018). 
Using these three models, storage resources can participate fully in the CAISO energy 
and ancillary services markets. CAISO does not have a forward capacity market, instead 
relying on a Resource Adequacy process to ensure an adequate supply is available to the 
market. Storage resources can participate as Resource Adequacy if they meet the 
requirements. The only concerns raised by stakeholder groups about the CAISO proposal 
was with regard to their treatment of Transmission Access Charges7. The Energy Storage 
Association, the largest and most vocal industry association for energy storage,  does not 
believe CAISO has clarified if storage resource dispatched by the ISO will be subject to 
                                                          
7 Fee to transport energy via the transmission grid 
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these charges, and has requested additional follow up from FERC on this point (Kaplan, 
2019a).  
2. Midcontinent Independent System Operator 
 MISO’s filing clarifies their definition of an Electric Storage Resource (ESR) as 
“a resource capable of receiving energy from the transmission system and storing it for 
later injection of energy back to the transmission system” (Malabonga, 2018). Unlike 
CAISO, MISO includes all types of energy storage within this definition, including 
pumped hydro units. They also clarify that behind the meter storage resources are not 
included in the ESR definition (Malabonga, 2018). ESRs can participate in the MISO 
energy and operating reserves markets through eight potential commitment status modes: 
Charge, Discharge, Continuous, Available, Not Participating, Emergency Charge, 
Emergency Discharge, and Outage (Malabonga, 2018).  
 By selecting one or a set of the eight modes above, an ESR participates in the 
energy and operating reserves market in whatever way is appropriate for the given 
technology. For example, continuous mode implies that the resources can transition 
seamlessly between charging and discharging and would be the likely choice for a 
standard battery storage system. A pumped hydro unit, in contrast, may not be able to 
quickly transition from charge to discharge, and instead may choose to bid in Charge or 
Discharge mode across an entire day or for specific market intervals. Units can also select 
Not Participating mode in order to offer ancillary services without an energy schedule 
(meaning the unit will participate in the ancillary services market but not in the energy 
market).  
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 MISO has indicated that they can only allow ESRs to start registering by the 
December 3, 2019 deadline, and will not be able to accommodate full participation until 
March 1, 2020 (Malabonga, 2018). Similar to the CAISO proposal, the Energy Storage 
Association remains unhappy with MISO’s treatment of Transmission Access Charges 
for ESRs (Kaplan, 2019b).   
3. Pennsylvania New Jersey Maryland Interconnection 
 The PJM filing uses the same acronym chosen by MISO to refer to energy storage 
resources, and overall reflects a similar market design strategy. ESRs in the PJM market 
can choose between three operation modes: Charge, Discharge, and Continuous (Glazer, 
Flynn, & Tribulski, 2018). As in the MISO participation model, Charge and Discharge 
mode are included for resources like pumped hydro that cannot quickly transition 
between charging and discharging. Most battery storage resources are expected to select 
Continuous mode.  
 The majority of the PJM filing was spent offering a defense of their selected 
minimum run time to offer forward capacity. PJM selected a minimum duration of ten 
hours to participate in the forward capacity market – a value significantly higher than 
other market proposals, which range from two to four hours of consecutive run time 
(Glazer et al., 2018). PJM stated that this run time was appropriate for all storage 
resources because it is the current requirement for pumped hydroelectric resources 
(Kaplan, 2019d).  Although resources can de-rate capacity to meet the ten-hour run time, 
PJM is facing criticism from industry groups for this requirement (Maloney, 2018). This 
run time requirement may reflect PJM’s preference for technology types like pumped 
hydro, compressed air energy storage, or flow batteries – resources that offer longer 
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durations. It is interesting to note that market rules may not be designed to be technology 
neutral. Instead, they may reflect the preferences or perceived needs of the ISO. 
 PJM was also the only RTO/ISO to submit two separate filings and request two 
implementation dates. The first filing detailed accounting updates the PJM would make 
by February of 2019 in order to enable full implementation by FERC’s deadline of 
December 3, 2019. The separation of these two filing was an interesting indication of the 
widely different impacts FERC’s Order 841 requirements will have on RTO/ISO markets 
over the next year. For some markets, implementing 841 fully will require meaningful 
time and resource commitments. For others, the changes will almost go unnoticed.   
4. New York Independent System Operator 
 NYISO’s definition of Energy Storage Resources closely matches the FERC 
definition, with a few additional specifications. NYISO clarifies that ESRs must store 
energy from the grid and later inject it onto the grid at the same point, and that ESRs 
must be able to “inject at a rate of at least 0.1 MW for a period of at least one hour” 
(Campbell, 2018). ESRs can participate in the NYISO markets as “Withdrawal-Eligible 
Generators,” meaning generators that are capable of withdrawing energy from the grid 
for the purpose of later injection back on the grid. NYISO proposes a “dispatch-only” 
participation model for ESRs, meaning participating ESRs are viewed as “always 
available” consistent with their bids (Campbell, 2018). NYISO can then dispatch freely 
between charge and discharge in line with their bidding parameters.  
 For resources that cannot operate in continuous dispatch mode as described 
above, they are still eligible to participate as an Energy Limited Resources (ELR) 
(Campbell, 2018). A pumped hydro resource participating in the NYISO market would 
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likely participate as an Energy Limited Resources, but stakeholders are concerned that 
the ELR model is not adequate even just for pumped hydro participation (Maloney, 
2018). In addition, NYISO’s filing prohibits storage resources from participating in both 
the retail and wholesale energy markets (Kaplan, 2019c). For storage resources located 
behind the customer meter, this restriction could be particularly limiting and runs counter 
to the objectives of Order 841 to expand participation opportunities for storage.  
5. Independent System Operator - New England 
 In line with FERC’s recommendations, ISO-NE defines an energy storage 
resource as “a facility that is capable of receiving electricity from the grid and storing the 
energy for later injection of electricity back to the grid” (Wolfson, Lombardi, & Grover, 
2018). In the ISO-NE market, ESRs will participate as “Electric Storage Facilities” which 
must register within two existing market constructs: a dispatchable Generator Asset –
allows the resource to inject capacity, energy, and ancillary services onto the grid - and a 
Dispatchable Asset Related Demand – which allows the resource to consume energy and 
provide demand response (Wolfson et al., 2018).  Resources within these market 
constructs then select one set of rules: 
1) Continuous Storage Facilities: similar to other market designs, the continuous 
storage rules assume a resource can transition seamlessly from charge to 
discharge, and can do so at any MW level that falls within their operating range 
(Wolfson et al., 2018). 
2) Binary Storage Facilities: designed primarily for pumped hydro units, these rules 
apply for resources that cannot transition seamlessly between charging and 
discharging (Wolfson et al., 2018). 
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To add even more complexity, ESRs that select the Continuous Storage Facility Rules 
must also opt to register as an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource (ATRR) in 
order to provide regulation services to the ISO-NE market (Wolfson et al., 2018). 
Because ISO-NE did not create a new market construct specifically for ESRs, but instead 
is requiring storage resources to register within existing market participation models, 
there are concerns that storage participation in ISO-NE may be more limited than in other 
markets (Maloney, 2018).  
6. Southwest Power Pool 
 SPP adopted FERC’s definition of electric storage, but added a clarification: 
resources are excluded from the electric storage categorization if they are physically 
incapable or contractually barred from injecting electric energy on to the transmission 
system (Wagner & Nolen, 2018). SPP’s filing is careful to state that energy storage 
resources can register and participate in SPP’s Integrated Marketplace as any existing 
resource type assuming they meet the requirements for participation. Storage can also 
participate specifically as a Market Storage Resource (MSR), a newly added resource 
type in the SPP market (Wagner & Nolen, 2018). In order to bid in to the energy market, 
MSRs must submit an Energy Offer Curve, which reflects the “Continuous” mode 
offered by a number of other market proposals. This Energy Offer Curve can include 
both positive and negative MW values, implying that the resource can transition between 
charging and discharging instantaneously. 
 Although SPP does not operate a capacity market, they do have a Resource 
Adequacy requirement for participating load serving entities much like the CAISO 
market. Storage resources are eligible to count as resource adequacy if they meet existing 
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market requirements (McAllister & Ramadevanahalli, 2019). Comments for the ESA do 
point to this capacity participation model as acceptable, but subject to manipulation in 
SPP stakeholder processes that could make it very challenging for storage to qualify as 
resource adequacy (Kaplan, 2019e). 
B. Comparison Table 
Table 5. Comparison of CAISO, MISO, PJM, NYISO, ISO-NE, and SPP Compliance Filings for FERC Order 841; filed 
December 3, 2018 (Campbell, 2018; Glazer et al., 2018; Malabonga, 2018; Wagner & Nolen, 2018; Weaver et al., 
2018; Wolfson et al., 2018) 8 
 CAISO MISO PJM NYISO ISO-NE SPP 
Energy market 
(DA, RT) 
market 
participation? 
Yes  
Forward 
capacity market 
participation? 
No 
→ No 
forward 
capacity 
market 
exists in 
CAISO. 
Resources 
can 
participate 
as Resource 
Adequacy 
resources if 
they meet 
requirement
s 
Yes 
→ ESRs can 
participate if 
they are able 
to meet 
minimum 
run time 
requirements 
Yes 
→ PJM has a 
3-year 
forward 
capacity 
market. 
“Capacity 
Storage 
Resource” 
redefined to 
include all 
ESRs able to 
meet run 
time 
requirements 
Yes 
→ESRs can 
participate in 
the Installed 
Capacity 
market if 
they meet 
criteria for a 
Generator 
plus ESR 
specific 
requirements  
Yes 
→ Storage 
resources 
can 
participate in 
the Forward 
Capacity 
Market 
through 
Generator 
Asset 
participation 
function 
No 
→ No 
forward 
capacity 
market exists 
in SPP, but 
ESRs that 
meet 
continuous 
run time 
requirements 
can 
participate as 
Resources 
Adequacy 
resources 
Ancillary 
services market 
participation? 
Yes 
→ Must 
meet 
specific 
eligibility 
requirement
s for 
Frequency 
Reg, 
Spinning 
and Non-
Spinning 
Reserves 
Yes  
→ No 
energy 
schedule is 
required to 
provide Reg, 
Spinning, 
and 
Supplementa
l Reserves, 
or Up/Down 
Ramp 
Capability 
Yes 
→ ESRs 
have 
participated 
in the PJM 
ancillary 
services 
market since 
2009. Can 
offer certain 
services 
without an 
energy 
Yes 
→ Reg 
Service and 
Operating 
Reserve 
(spinning, 
non-
spinning, 30-
min reserve) 
when also 
submitting 
an energy 
schedule 
Yes 
→ Can 
participate in 
the forward 
reserves 
market, 
regulation 
market, 
provide 
black start, 
reactive 
power, and 
primary 
Yes 
→ Reg Up & 
Down, and 
Spinning 
Reserves 
procured 
through the 
market. 
Other 
ancillary 
services 
require a 
separate, 
                                                          
8 DA = Day-Ahead; RT = Real-Time; ESRs = Energy Storage Resources; Reg = Regulation 
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schedule frequency 
response 
non-market 
application  
Market services 
that can be 
provided9 
1) DA & 
RT Energy 
2) DA & 
RT 
Frequency 
Reg 
(up/down 
ramping) 
3) Spinning 
Reserves 
4) Non-
Spinning 
Reserves 
5) 
Resources 
Adequacy  
1) DA & RT 
Energy 
2) DA & RT 
Frequency 
Reg 
(up/down 
ramping) 
3) Forward 
Capacity 
4) 
Regulation 
Reserves 
5) Spinning 
Reserves 
6) 
Supplementa
l Reserves 
7) Blackstart 
Service 
8) Reactive 
Supply and 
Voltage 
Control  
1) DA & RT 
Energy 
2) Forward 
Capacity 
3) 
Synchronize
d Reserves  
4) Non-
synchronized 
Reserves 
5) DA & RT 
Frequency 
Reg 
(up/down 
ramping) 
6) Reactive 
services 
7) Black start 
(min 16-hour 
duration) 
1) DA & RT 
Energy 
2) Forward 
Capacity 
3) Frequency 
Regulation 
4) Spinning 
reserves 
5) Non-
spinning 
reserves 
6) 30-min 
reserves 
7) Voltage 
support 
1) DA & RT 
Energy 
2) DA & RT 
Frequency 
Reg 
(up/down 
ramping) 
3) Forward 
Capacity 
4) 
Regulation 
Reserves 
5) Spinning 
Reserves 
6) Non-
spinning 
Reserves 
7) Blackstart 
Service 
8) Reactive 
Supply and 
Voltage 
Control 
1) DA & RT 
Energy 
2) DA & RT 
Frequency 
Reg 
(up/down 
ramping) 
3) Resource 
Adequacy 
4) 
Regulation 
Reserves 
5) Spinning 
Reserves 
6) Non-
spinning 
Reserves 
7) Reactive 
Supply and 
Voltage 
Control 
Minimum Size 100kW 
Minimum 
consecutive run 
time to offer 
forward 
capacity 
N/A 4 hours 
across 
coincident 
peak 
10 hours on 
a summer 
peak day 
4 hours 2 hours N/A 
Ability to de-
rate capacity? 
Yes 
→ All resources can de-rate to meet the minimum run times above, and a market 
monitor will watch for potential market manipulation via physical withholding 
Execute 
wholesale 
transactions at 
LMP? 
Yes Yes Yes  
→ But only 
for purchases 
of energy 
that are later 
resold to 
PJM 
Yes 
→ But only 
for purchases 
of energy 
that are later 
resold to 
NYISO 
Yes Yes 
Ability to self-
manage state of 
charge (SOC)? 
Yes 
→ Storage 
resources 
can self-
manage or 
allow 
CAISO to 
manage 
SOC 
through 
Yes 
→ SOC can 
be 
communicate
d via 
commitment 
status in 
particular 
dispatch 
intervals. 
Yes 
→ ESRs are 
required to 
manage SOC 
through 
offers, 
modes and 
bid 
parameters. 
Market 
Yes 
→ resources 
can self-
manage SOC 
or elect to 
have NYISO 
manage 
Energy 
Level given 
submitted 
Maybe 
→Via bid 
parameters, 
but 
explanation 
was not very 
convincing 
as to if 
resources 
will really be 
Yes 
→ Must 
communicate 
SOC through 
bid 
parameters, 
SOC 
forecast, and 
in real time 
via 
                                                          
9 As listed in FERC Order 841 compliance filings. May not be comprehensive. 
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market 
optimizatio
n 
optimization 
available 
only for 
pumped 
hydro. 
bid 
parameters. 
IMM will 
watch for 
withholding/
market 
manipulation 
able to self-
manage 
telemetry. 
No market 
mechanism 
to manage 
SOC and no 
plans to add 
one 
Participate as a 
buyer or seller? 
Yes 
Prevent conflict 
dispatch 
Yes 
→ Resources submit a single bid curve in some version 
of “continuous” mode (with supply as negative 
generation) which prevents conflict dispatch  
Maybe 
→Descriptio
n is far less 
clear than 
other filings  
Yes 
→ Prevented 
through 
Energy Offer 
Curve  
Storage make-
whole payments 
Eligible 
Implementation 
date requested 
December 
3, 2019 
March 1, 
2020 
Feb 3, 2019: 
Accounting 
updates 
Dec 3, 2019: 
Fully 
implemented  
May 1, 2020 December 3, 
2019 for 
majority, 
January 1, 
2024 for 
DARD 
participation 
as a 
Regulation 
Resource 
December 1, 
2019 
 
VI. Results 
A. Value and Market Efficiency 
 FERC Order 841 is shifting the relationship between private and social value for 
energy storage resources by creating newly available revenue streams.  Private value in 
this realm refers to the revenue streams available to an individual actor or project owner, 
whereas social value refers to the benefits and services available to the grid at large 
(assessed here at the RTO/ISO level). Overall, the RTO/ISO market compliance filings 
for FERC Order 841 are similar. Most filings met the majority of requirements for items 
like market participation, minimum capacity size, and market participation as both a 
buyer and seller at wholesale LMP. There are many successes to be celebrated here; for 
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example, in the PJM and MISO markets, storage was not eligible to participate in the 
energy market prior to Order 841. The introduction of a participation model for storage in 
these energy markets creates new value opportunities for private project owners and 
creates social value by increasing the diversity of resources available to provide energy. 
A more diverse resource mix offers a variety of grid benefits, including improved system 
resiliency.  
 Similarly, prior to Order 841 storage resources could participate either as a 
generator or as load (demand response) in SPP. Now, with the addition of SPP’s Market 
Storage Resource, storage can participate in the energy market on a continuous spectrum 
from load to generation. This participation opportunity resolves a disconnect between 
private value and social value – project owners gain value by more thoughtfully 
switching between supply and demand to align with real-time LMP, and the SPP system 
gains social value through the added flexibility of a continuous resource.  
 Energy market participation in PJM and MISO, and multi-market participation in 
SPP are just two examples of the way Order 841 reduced dead weight loss and eliminated 
the misalignment between the value individual resources can provide (energy) and a 
social service the grid needs (diverse energy resources for reliability and resiliency). 
Therefore, based on the initial compliance filings it appears that Order 841 should be 
considered a success because it has eliminated arbitrary participation barriers for energy, 
capacity, and ancillary services and forced the development of adequate participation 
models for storage in these markets. In theory, meaningful dead weight loss created by 
the lack of these basic participation models has been eliminated and overall market 
efficiency has improved. 
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 Looking beyond these immediate market efficiency successes, more nuanced 
differences between the RTO/ISO participation models emerge at the intersection of 
private and social value. Two requirements that stand out for diversity within the 
compliance filings are: 
1) Minimum run time required to offer forward capacity 
2) State of charge management 
A quick review of the comparative analysis above reveals that not all markets chose the 
same minimum consecutive run time to offer forward capacity. ISO-NE selected a run 
time as low as two hours, while PJM requested 10 hours on a summer peak day. Capacity 
duration is closely tied to social value for decarbonization, but current project economics 
favor shorter duration resources. Although the Energy Storage Association is not happy 
with PJM’s 10-hour capacity run time requirement, it may in fact be the most socially 
optimal of the filings thanks to the benefits of long duration storage for grid 
decarbonization. PJM has not required this onerous run time for its energy or ancillary 
services market, and therefore one could argue that from a value maximization 
perspective their selected run time may be more efficient than other market proposals if 
decarbonization value was fully quantified. The relationship between storage duration 
and value for decarbonization is still fuzzy at this point and warrants further research. But 
it is important to caution against a dismissal of lengthy run time requirements for capacity 
without additional research and analysis to quantify the relationship between duration and 
social decarbonization value.  
 Lingering tension between private and social value plays out most visibly in each 
market’s treatment of state of charge, where the compliance filings show a surprising 
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diversity of approaches. The relationship between private and social value for state of 
charge management will be analyzed further as a case study in section B from the lens of 
private or social value prioritization. Because state of charge is closely tied to project 
longevity, managing it over the course of a market day and project lifetime is risky for 
operators. Market rules to promote efficiency through state of charge management are 
complicated by concerns over resource ownership and control, both of which are tied to 
capturing enough revenue streams to justify financial investments in the project.  
B. Case Study: State of Charge Management 
 State of charge (SOC) management is a critical and controversial topic for energy 
storage resources. FERC Order 841 specifically addresses state of charge management, 
stating that “in this Final Rule, we require each RTO/ISO to allow electric storage 
resources to self-manage their state of charge” (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
2018). State of charge refers to the level of stored energy available within the storage 
resource at a given moment in time. RTO/ISOs must allow project owners to manage this 
level as well as their upper and lower charge limits. Because Order 841 also allows 
storage resources to de-rate their capacity to meet minimum run time requirements, state 
of charge management also raises concerns about capacity withholding and potential 
market manipulation. Strategy and treatment of state of charge management is the area 
with the most complexity in the proposed tariff filing. In fact, a response filing from 
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FERC in early April of 2019 requested specifically that RTO/ISOs file additional follow 
up information related to state of charge management (Bade, 2019)10. 
 The RTO/ISO approaches to SOC management vary across a spectrum of market 
efficiency. This section will look in more detail at the approach each RTO/ISO takes 
regarding SOC management and using economic theory of market efficiency will assess 
each market’s balancing of private and social value. Generally, SOC is managed through 
a combination of bidding parameters, self-scheduled resource commitments, RTO/ISO 
dispatch decisions, and real-time market optimization software. In the day-ahead energy 
market, resources can submit a variety of bidding parameters to indicate how their state 
of charge should be managed – the table below shows an example set of bidding 
parameters from the SPP compliance filing.  
                                                          
10 The SOC management strategies are still, therefore, in development. Clarification from the RTO/ISOs in 
response to FERC’s request may reveal that strategy has shifted or was misrepresented in the initial 
filings. 
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Table 6. SPP Offer Parameters (Wagner & Nolen, 2018) 
 
 In combination with the bidding parameters, resources can submit an energy 
schedule (self-schedule) which indicates exactly how the resource should be dispatched 
throughout the day. This option offers the most individual control and the most 
aggressive risk management for the project owner. Beyond self-schedule, many markets 
offer to dispatch the resource economically in the real-time market, using bidding 
parameters as guide points to ensure the resource stays within its operational constraints. 
In this market dispatch scenario, resources do not submit a full energy schedule, and the 
real-time market solves for the least-cost solution every five minutes to drive dispatch 
decisions. Going one step further, some markets offer dispatch optimization in the real-
time market which looks at predicted demand and pricing several hours ahead in the 
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market before determining how to dispatch resources. These solutions for SOC 
management will be discussed in more detail within three categories below: Optimization 
of Social and Private Value, Prioritization of Private Value, and Prioritization of Social 
Value. 
 
Optimization of Social and Private Value: CAISO, NYISO 
 CAISO’s treatment of SOC comes the closest to market efficiency of any of the 
filings. According to the CAISO compliance filing: “The CAISO accounts for storage 
resources’ state of charge and charging constraints. The CAISO offers storage resources 
the flexibility to manage their state of charge on their own (through bidding), or to have 
the CAISO market optimization process manage the resource’s state of charge and 
charging limits (through bidding and master file parameters)” (Weaver et al., 2018). This 
means that although resources can fully self-manage SOC if desired (as required by 
Order 841), they can also opt in to a market optimization system that will dispatch the 
resources optimally over a 1 hour 45-minute time window in the real-time market. This 
optimization option in theory should maximize both social and private value and 
minimize deadweight loss in the market, because the optimization time window mitigates 
the social/market risk of dispatching a resource only minutes before it is more desperately 
needed to meet an anticipated increase in demand. This window of optimization should 
also maximize value for the storage resource because a dispatch decision made only in 
five-minute increments might discharge the resources at 10:00am, when in reality the 
need is much higher at 11:30am. Higher need for the grid is expressed in higher LMP 
prices, and therefore higher profit available for the private actor to capture. 
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 CAISO’s SOC management strategy is still far from perfect, however. An issue 
paper released earlier this year describes some of the SOC optimization changes that 
CAISO is looking to make. The briefing explains, “The real-time market optimization 
horizon may impede scheduling coordinators from optimally managing their NGR over 
the day. The real-time market optimizes schedules over a 1 hour and 45-minute time 
horizon that does not consider conditions later in the day” (California ISO, 2019).  
CAISO does have a sophisticated market optimization system in place, but that 
optimization is limited to a window of less than two hours. A more efficient participation 
model would optimize state of charge across an even more extended time window such as 
four or eight hours. While CAISO has made strides towards optimal SOC management 
and resource dispatch, there is still net value to be captured (and positive externalities 
eliminated) if the optimization window can be expanded further across the market day. 
 NYISO’s state of charge management strategy includes many of the same bidding 
parameters as SPP, but also requires resources to choose between two participation 
options (Campbell, 2018): 
1. ISO-Managed Energy Level: ESR’s energy level (SOC) constraints will be directly 
accounted for in the optimization. 
2. Self-Managed Energy Level: indicates the ESR’s energy level (SOC) constraints will 
not be directly accounted for in the optimization, on the assumption that resources 
will self-manage their dispatch using available bidding parameters. 
Energy storage resources can only select one of these modes for all hours in the day-
ahead market but can switch between the two every hour in the real-time market. If 
resources select the ISO-Managed option, NYISO will select the least production cost 
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solution (Campbell, 2018). The day-ahead market is optimized over a 24-hour window, 
but real-time market optimization only occurs across a 1-2.5 hour period (real-time 
commitments are optimized over 2.5-hour window, and real -time dispatch over a 1-hour 
window) (Campbell, 2018). Self-managed resources must manage their own state of 
charge across the day, and will be penalized for any mismanagement (Campbell, 2018). 
This market design for state of charge management closely matches the CAISO market 
design, with clear options between self-managed and market-managed SOC and similar 
real-time optimization time frames. Although market actors do not have complete 
information, dispatch decisions are being adjusted within a 1-hour window of market 
information. However, NYISO’s filing indicated that they will not be able to implement 
the proposed tariff changes until May of 2020 instead of the requested deadline of 
December 2019. This indicates that NYISO may still be developing much of the market 
optimization software described, unlike CAISO where this sort of optimization software 
is already in use.  
 
Prioritization of Private Value: MISO, PJM, SPP 
 MISO’s compliance filings listed a number of bidding parameters resources must 
submit in order to participate in the energy market, including parameters like SOC, 
minimum and maximum SOC, and emergency minimum and maximum SOC 
(Malabonga, 2018). A resource’s state of charge can be managed in a particular dispatch 
interval by using or adjusting commitment status, energy dispatch status, the energy offer 
curve, dispatch limits, or self-schedule volumes (Malabonga, 2018).  
  
58 
 
 In the day ahead market offer, or in real-time through telemetry, resources 
communicate and therefore control SOC. MISO explicitly states that energy storage 
resources are required to manage their own state of charge, and no market optimization or 
market-managed SOC option is available (Vannoy, 2018). Kevin Vannoy, MISO’s 
Director of Market Design, explains that although limited SOC management software is 
available for pumped hydro resources, it cannot be used for more flexible storage units 
because it assumes only one charge/discharge cycle per day and does not contain 
constraints for daily minimum or maximum charging energy (Vannoy, 2018) However, if 
storage resources offer flexibility to the market dispatch (communicated through bidding 
parameters) they will be charged and discharged economically throughout the day. Fully 
self-scheduled resources will be dispatched as scheduled instead of most economically 
across the day (Vannoy, 2018).  
 In the PJM market, energy storage resources are required to manage their own 
state of charge through offers and mode scheduling (continuous, charge, or discharge) 
(Glazer et al., 2018). Offers can be for a dispatched resource, or self-scheduled with a 
non-dispatchable range, similar to the process described in the MISO market. If 
continuous mode is scheduled, the resources can switch between charging and 
discharging but this mode is not economically optimized over time. Dispatch decisions 
are based solely on real-time LMP, and are not optimized across any window of time 
(Glazer et al., 2018). Similarly, the day-ahead market is not economically optimized.  
 SPP’s compliance filing indicates that they explicitly will not manage state of 
charge for participating energy storage resources (Wagner & Nolen, 2018). The market 
participant is expected to self-manage all SOC variables through bidding parameters and 
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an energy schedule submitted the day ahead. Much like the MISO and PJM market 
proposals, energy storage resources can submit a dispatchable range as part of their 
bidding parameters instead of a schedule, which allows for market economics to guide 
resource dispatch through the day. However, this methodology does not include any 
optimization of dispatch across the day.  
 From a market efficiency perspective, MISO, PJM and SPP are all prioritizing 
private control and private risk mitigation instead of aiming to maximize net benefits 
(both private and social) from storage participation. Although this is likely viewed by 
market participants as favorable for private value stream management, it may increase 
overall deadweight loss in the market and therefore reduce available value for both 
private and social actors. In other words, this strategy allows private actors to fully 
control what revenues end up in their private value stack, but it does not eliminate all 
positive externalities and may not capture all available value in the market. 
 
Prioritization of Social Value: ISO-NE 
 ISO-NE has taken a notably different approach to state of charge management 
than other markets. ISO-NE has chosen not to represent SOC as a bidding parameter as 
most of the other markets have. Instead, SOC will be only a telemetry value, represented 
as Available Energy and Available Storage (Wolfson et al., 2018). However, because this 
approach is telemetered it is questionable whether market participants are really able to 
control SOC as required by Order 841. ISO-NE’s filing explains:  
 “For Continuous Storage Facilities, Available Energy and Available Storage will 
also be telemetered to ISO-NE, but for these facilities, software will automatically 
update Maximum Consumption Limit and Economic Maximum Limit values in 
order to meet the same duration requirements. As noted above, the automation of 
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this process for Continuous Storage Facilities eliminates the need for the 
participant to telephone the ISO-NE control room each time a Continuous 
Storage Facility updates its physical operating limits to align with its state of 
charge. The automation also helps ensure that the facility’s operating limits are 
accurate and therefore that the desired dispatch points issued by ISO-NE are 
feasible and the facility has sufficient energy to follow them.” (Wolfson et al., 
2018).  
 
Industry groups have interpreted this opaque statement to mean that ISO-NE will 
automatically de-rate energy storage resources every few minutes to ensure adequate 
capacity is available to the market (Maloney, 2018). This approach prioritizes 
maximizing social value to the grid, but at the expense of private control. It is not clear at 
this point if the approach taken by ISO-NE is in compliance with FERC Order 841 or if it 
too strictly limits individual control. ISO-NE claims that SOC can still be adequately 
managed by the market participant through day-ahead or real-time Supply Offers or 
Demand Bids (Wolfson et al., 2018), but places more emphasis on value and control for 
the market at large. 
 Managing state of charge is a challenge unique to energy storage resources, and 
the strategies proposed above by each of the six markets are still very much in 
development. Some markets are aiming for full market optimization, which will 
minimize deadweight loss but may come at the expense of private control and risk 
management. Other markets are focused on preserving autonomy and control for 
individual participants, seemingly through a focus on maximizing private value by 
offering participants full control of their private value stack. However, the unintended 
result of this strategy may be an increase in deadweight loss in the market and missed 
private and social value opportunities. One market, ISO-NE, has pushed so far towards a 
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prioritization of social value and control that they may not be in compliance with FERC 
Order 841 and may be required to revise their strategy.  
 It is interesting to note that the two markets that are closest to optimizing state of 
charge management are primarily single-state markets: CAISO and NYISO. California 
and New York also happen to be two of the most progressive states in the country, and 
both have energy storage deployment mandates in place. This indicates that there may be 
some interaction between state policy and market rules, with policy pushing market 
design towards a more optimal outcome for all actors. As the market matures, private 
actors may be more willing to give up resource control as they begin to trust that market 
optimization processes will increase their individual revenue streams and not just 
optimize social value to the market. It is also worth noting, and will be explored further in 
Section VII, that the sole objective of market rule design may not be to maximize net 
value through efficient market design. Instead, market design decisions may be driven by 
institutional objectives, perceptions of control and autonomy, or state policy goals  
C. Excluded Value Streams  
 Although FERC Order 841 made excellent progress towards increasing 
participation opportunities for energy storage and thereby creating additional private and 
social value in the industry, there is still a gap between services a storage resource can 
provide versus services a resource can actually be compensated for. Said differently, 
Order 841 was not exhaustive and not all storage value streams exist. Notably, avoided 
cost from deferred transmission and distribution upgrades remain difficult to quantify in 
order to monetize in a revenue stream. Much work beyond FERC Order 841 will be 
necessary to fully fill the gap between theoretical and actualized revenue streams, and 
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thereby further eliminate deadweight loss in the storage market. A report from the 
Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC) discusses this challenge:  
“In all states, the value of storage to network or distribution services, such as 
avoiding substation or circuit upgrades, are not currently priced or monetized.  
Presently, the “value” of such services is typically assumed to be the avoided cost 
of the alternative, traditional solution, which does not account for other supply or 
load benefits that storage can provide. (Stanfield et al., 2017) 
The solar industry is facing many of the same challenges, especially for distributed solar 
resources. The state of Minnesota has struggled to develop a methodology to quantify the 
value of distributed solar in order to set compensation rates for community solar gardens. 
Currently the Minnesota value of solar is one static number across the state, despite the 
fact that resource value varies meaningfully based on location on the grid the impacts that 
location has on local infrastructure – either triggering distribution/substation upgrades or 
helping avoid upgrades. Quantifying the private value storage offers to support existing 
infrastructure and delay necessary upgrades remains a future challenge for storage 
markets to grapple with. 
 Returning to the concept of value stacking, as the storage industry matures it 
should also shift the focus from private, individual value stacks to stacks of the full 
market value – including both private and social values. Figure 12, below, illustrates this 
full value stack in the context of the current storage market. Without a more complete 
definition of value stack that takes all social values into account, private incentives to 
deploy storage will be insufficient to deploy all socially beneficial storage. Efficient 
markets where these two value streams are maximized (in the tallest stack!) is where the 
United States will see game-changing, rapid deployments of energy storage.  
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Figure 12. Private + Social Value Stack Illustration 
VII. Discussion & Conclusion 
A. Barriers to Market Efficiency 
 The diversity of approaches in Section VI B begs the question: what is preventing 
FERC-regulated markets from optimizing both private and social value, for state of 
charge management and all market rules that apply to energy storage? Why are market 
failures still present? 
 First, it is worth acknowledging the reality that perfectly efficient markets do not 
exist. Especially in the energy industry, competition is often non-existent thanks to 
monopoly service territories, demand fluctuates unpredictably in real time, and a variety 
of social costs and benefits continue to be excluded from the market. Achieving perfect 
market efficiency is not possible. However, for energy storage resource participation, 
many market rules remain far from the “optimal” realm even after FERC Order 841. 
  
64 
 
Therefore, we must look beyond economic theory for barriers preventing RTO/ISO 
markets from maximizing the value stack of private and social value. 
 The lack of optimized storage participation rules may simply be due to 
organizational resource constraints. Energy market rulemaking requires thoughtful 
modeling and analysis, and markets with fewer resources may err on the side of 
“compliance only” instead of ongoing iterations and stakeholder processes which help 
refine optimal rules over time. Similarly, the timeline for submitting filings and actually 
implementing tariff changes for FERC Order 841 may have prevented optimal 
rulemaking in some markets. For markets with no existing participation model for energy 
storage, limiting the implementation strategy to what could reasonably be accomplished 
by December of 2019 was a must. That may explain why some markets, such as SPP, 
offered no optimization for state of charge management – they may have simply needed 
more time to develop the complex software necessary for SOC optimization. In addition, 
RTO/ISO markets may need financial support or outside expertise to develop the 
necessary optimization software to manage state of charge across an extended time 
window. This could be an opportunity for federal funding and intellectual support from 
the DOE. 
 Institutional barriers may also play a role in preventing optimized private-social 
value relationships. Today, RTO/ISO participation is voluntary in the United States. Not 
all utilities participate in an organized market, especially in the western states. RTO/ISOs 
are hesitant to overstep their authority and isolate or upset members. In early 2018, Xcel 
Colorado withdrew from the Mountain West Transmission group to avoid joining the 
SPP market.  Stakeholders familiar with the situation say that Xcel Colorado feared 
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joining SPP would limit the utility’s operational freedom (Bade, 2018). Similarly, when 
CAISO realized no utility outside of California would agree to join the CAISO market for 
fear of California state legislative oversight, they created the western EIM. CAISO is still 
tiptoeing through the expansion of the EIM to ensure participating members feel that 
their individual freedoms are protected. In this way, private-social value dynamics are 
playing out at multiple levels: between utilities and RTO/ISOs, and between independent 
power producers/project owners and RTO/ISOs.  
 RTO/ISO’s with members who are more sensitive to limitations on autonomy and 
individual control may be more likely to design market rules to protect that private 
autonomy instead of working to maximize grid-level benefits. Although this strategy does 
leave value on the table, it may be a necessary strategy to increase the number of 
participating members. 
 Finally, RTO/ISO markets may not be achieving optimal net private and social 
value because they are not experiencing a strong enough push from state policy, federal 
policy, or the private sector. In California, state policy that mandated energy storage 
procurement drove CAISO to launch its energy storage participation model development 
in 2010. As a result, when FERC finally demanded RTO/ISOs develop an adequate 
participation model for energy storage through Order 841, the CAISO market found itself 
years ahead of other energy markets. Similarly, while private sector activity surrounding 
energy storage (particularly battery storage) is growing rapidly, it still represents only a 
tiny fraction of the generation and dispatchable load capacity available in the United 
States. As a result, there is not a strong push from the private sector for more 
sophisticated market rules and participation models for energy storage. Without a push 
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from FERC, many RTO/ISOs would still be encouraging energy storage resources to use 
existing participation models instead of providing custom participation options. An ideal 
energy storage market with perfectly priced value streams would not require any policy 
mandates, but U.S. storage market rules are still very much in development and not yet 
fully optimized. Policy, such as state-level deployment mandates, may be required to 
continue pushing the market towards efficiency. Learning-by-doing thanks to policy 
mandates may expand total available value by reducing soft costs and reducing risks 
associated with project financing. 
B. FERC Order 841 and Storage Value for Decarbonization 
 For U.S. energy markets to operate efficiently, it is important for them to be 
technology neutral. Appropriately, most of the Order 841 compliance filings do just 
that11. As previously discussed, storage resources are not exclusively useful for grid 
decarbonization. In fact, depending on the implementation of the resources, energy 
storage can even increase carbon emissions on the grid. As market rules for energy 
storage shift and markets aim for optimization, it is important to consider decarbonization 
as a type of social value and how storage resources can most appropriately contribute to 
social decarbonization goals. 
 First, an efficient market must include all relevant costs and benefits. In U.S. 
energy markets, the social cost of carbon is not incorporated in market transactions12. As 
a result, carbon intensive resources like natural gas and coal remain economical and often 
it is more affordable for energy storage resources to charge off of these resources. The 
                                                          
11 PJM’s filing may not be technology neutral given the ten-hour run time requirement. 
12 Except in California and New England where there is a carbon price on electricity, but it is below the 
social cost of carbon (“State Actions,” 2019) 
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simplest fix for this market failure would be to add a tax on carbon emissions for all 
energy generating resources (Keohane & Olmstead, 2016). For storage resources, this 
would incentivize charging from lower carbon resources like wind, solar and nuclear 
because the market prices for carbon-intensive resources would increase and reduce the 
profitability of energy arbitrage for storage. Although the idea of a national carbon tax 
makes economic sense, it remains politically infeasible in the United States and is 
unlikely to pass in the near future. The most feasible attempt at a state-level carbon tax 
was on the ballot in Washington state in fall 2018, and it failed to pass for the second 
time (D. Roberts, 2018). Many advocacy groups hoped this state carbon tax could serve 
as a model policy for other states, and its failure does not bode well for other state-level 
efforts. 
 Second, recent modeling work has shown that longer duration storage resources 
offer more grid-level value for decarbonization. Minimum run time requirements for 
storage resources are generating significant controversy in the Order 841 compliance 
filings, with PJM requiring a ten-hour run time to offer forward capacity. Energy storage 
advocates and industry groups are outraged over this requirement because it excludes 
many already-built resources from participating fully in the market, despite the fact that it 
aligns with decarbonization objectives. Given that the objective of Order 841 was to 
increase participation opportunities for storage, the outrage over further limits to 
participation is expected. With a ten-hour duration requirement, most currently 
financeable energy storage resources – like lithium-ion battery systems – will be 
excluded from participating in the PJM capacity market. 
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 The current prevalence of short duration lithium-ion battery technologies creates a 
risk of technology lock-in for the storage market. If new market rules increase 
participation opportunities for these shorter-duration resources, that may further increase 
the market dominance of lithium-ion battery technology and prevent further R&D work 
on long duration technologies that can offer higher social value for decarbonization. A 
policy response may be appropriate here. At the federal level, R&D funding should be 
allocated specifically for developing long duration storage (defined as storage that can 
operate for at least ten consecutive hour). Current technology solutions, with the 
exception of pumped hydro, are not cost effective at such long durations. At the state 
policy level, states can offer tax incentives for energy storage that only long duration 
resources are eligible for. This could incentivize the deployment of additional long 
duration storage that otherwise would not be cost effective, and hopefully prevent 
technology lock-in in the U.S. storage market.  
 Third, policy can encourage storage resources to provide services that are 
complimentary to renewable generation resources. Among the many services that energy 
storage can provide to the grid, the following align well with renewables: energy time 
shift, frequency regulation, and spinning reserves. Without a carbon tax in place, energy 
arbitrage is a potentially damaging service for the grid if stakeholders are aiming for 
decarbonization. The federal ITC is doing this well by requiring storage resources to be 
paired with a renewable resource in order to claim the tax credit.  
 Finally, optimized state of charge management market rules in the NYISO and 
CAISO markets indicate that state deployment mandates may be incentivizing or 
accelerating the development of market rules that optimize both social and private value 
  
69 
 
stacks. Although accurately priced market mechanisms should in theory preclude the 
necessity of policy mandates, reality indicates that these deployment mandates may be 
nudging market rules toward efficiency. Similar mandates should be considered in all 
states as a tool to both accelerate deployment in support of decarbonization goals, and to 
push market rules closer to overall market efficiency with minimized deadweight loss. 
C. Conclusion 
 FERC Order 841 was a landmark rulemaking for the energy storage industry. 
Although energy storage has long played an important role on the grid in the form of 
pumped hydroelectric, recent cost declines in battery storage technology present an 
opportunity to make energy storage a much more prominent player in U.S. energy 
markets. Battery storage offers a multitude of services to the grid, and importantly adds 
value by operating as both supply and demand. A number of states have addressed 
storage directly through mandates or incentive programs, and FERC has touched on 
storage indirectly in a handful of previous orders. However, Order 841 was the first time 
that FERC released a rulemaking fully dedicated to enabling the growing energy storage 
industry. Order 841 demanded RTO/ISOs develop full participation models for energy 
storage in the energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets. 
 Perhaps the most important takeaway from this work is that FERC Order 841 is 
not the end of market rule development for energy storage. In fact, in most ways it is only 
the beginning. Important tensions remain between private value and social value for 
energy storage, and there is room for additional optimization to increase overall net 
benefits from storage deployment by further eliminating market failures. Importantly, 
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Order 841 excludes behind-the-meter resources. As the Rocky Mountain Institute 
identified in their 2015 report, BTM may in fact be the optimal location for energy 
storage resources because they are able to capture the maximum number of revenue 
streams from a BTM location (Fitzgerald et al., 2015). FERC is already moving forward 
with an order to address BTM aggregation for wholesale market participation, which 
could dramatically change the revenue opportunities for BTM storage resources. These 
resources are incredibly versatile but will be even more challenging to value and 
compensate than distribution or transmission connected storage resources. 
 There are a variety of reasons why RTO/ISOs are not maximizing net private and 
social value from energy storage resources. For one, time and resources may be a 
constraint. Additional support from the federal government, industry associations, or 
nonprofits may be needed to expedite the process of continued participation model 
development. From the academic community, more research is needed on the 
institutional barriers for market optimization at RTO/ISOs in the United States. In what 
ways are concerns about autonomy and control getting in the way of potential value-
maximizing rulemaking, and what market structures could make participants still feel in 
control while optimizing both private and social value from energy storage resources? 
 State and federal policy is needed to ensure that as storage deployment continues 
to accelerate, it is installed and operated in a way that aligns with social decarbonization 
goals. Market rules can and must remain technology neutral to support efficient market 
operations. Policy, however, can be used to nudge market operations towards social goals 
potentially via state-level storage deployment mandates. 
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 The market rules and policy surrounding energy storage are changing every day. 
In many ways, that made it challenging to complete this work. Most resources from 
before 2015 are too outdated to still be relevant. In addition, Order 841 is an active 
proceeding and FERC is still responding to the filed proposals with requests for 
additional information and change requests. The final tariffs may look different than the 
versions on file today. However, this research is a first step towards further adaptation of 
market rules for energy storage. Comparing and learning from the strategies filed for 
FERC Order 841 will be critical to determine the appropriate next steps for actors at the 
local, state, and federal level seeking to expedite the deployment of energy storage to 
build a cleaner, more resilient U.S. electric grid. 
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